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Condon: Constitutional Urban Redevelopment

NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
Unregulated urbran growth nurtures decay. This is particularly
true in those blighted and slum areas in which the lower income
element lives. Present Florida law recognizes a distinction between
blighted and slum areas., Both, however, are characterized by a preponderance of dilapidated, unhealthy, and frequently unsafe dwellings. Further, it has been found that such deleterious conditions are
conducive to crime and juvenile delinquency. Those who live within
these areas usually fail to pay taxes or are consistently delinquent in
payment. Thus the expenditure of public funds is grossly out of
2
proportion to the amount received from these areas.
The city, as a victim of blight or slums, possesses no inherent
power to rid itself of this malady. A city exists by the grace of the
state legislature, and it can exercise only those powers delegated by
special or general acts of that body.3 Legislation to alleviate the plight
of the cities has taken the form of urban renewal or redevelopment
acts. This note is devoted to judicial attitudes toward redevelopment
acts. Emphasis is given to an analysis of the currently uncertain
Florida position in this area.
EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE POLICE POWER

A workable solution of the slum problem would be passage of
a development act that provides for land assembly and clearance as
well as rehabilitation.5 New York passed the first urban redevelopment corporation law in 1941.6 The New York act and subsequent
developmental legislation provide an effective means for land assembly and clearance as well as for rehabilitation.7 Under most development acts, a city is authorized to acquire the fee to a blighted or
iGrubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
2Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 23077, §1.
3FLA. CONST. art. III, §24. For a history of the development of municipal
corporations see Tooke, Status of the Municipal Corporation in American Law, 16
MINN. L. REv. 343 (1932).
(Smith-Hurd Supp.
4E.g., Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 23077; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67/
1959); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§3401-26 (McKinney Supp. 1960).
5See FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 922 (1949).

6N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§3401-26 (McKinney Supp. 1960).
7See note 4 supra.

[3441
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slum area by outright purchase or by use of the power of eminent
domain.
Eminent domain is the process of condemning private property
for public use.8 It is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, permitting
the state to take private property for public use; it is not necessarily
created by either constitution or statute. 9 The power is a dormant
right in the sovereign until legislative action points out the occasions,
modes, and agencies for its exercise.'0 The determination of what constitutes a public use is ultimately for the judiciary."' Although the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by a city or a public redevelopment authority has generally been upheld, 12 exercise of this
power by a private developer is subject to challenge.
The typical redevelopment act provides for sale or lease of purchased or condemned land to private developers who take the land
subject to restrictions in the lease or the covenants running with the
land. A general requirement for condemnation and sale is that it be
for a public purpose. The majority of courts that have passed on the
"public purpose" and "public use" issues with respect to redevelopment acts have upheld the corresponding enabling statutes.13 At
present only the states of South Carolina and Florida have cases,
arising under general legislation, that declare redevelopment acts invalid.' 4 It should be noted that these decisions invalidated the legislation because it was to be implemented by private developers and
the concurrent condemnation and sale would not have been for a
public use. These cases, then, not only require a public purpose in
order for these acts to be valid but also require that the use be public.
sSee Grover Irrig. & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch Reservoir & Irrig. Co., 21 Wyo.
204, 131 Pac. 43 (1913). "Public purpose" and "public use" are often used interchangeably by the courts. "Public purpose," originally a term associated exclusively
with taxation, has subsequently been applied when eminent domain or taxation is
referred to. See Note, 52 YALE L.J. 634, 639, n.24 (1943).
9Schrader v. Third Jud. Dist. Ct., 58 Nev. 188, 73 P.2d 493 (1937); Philadelphia
Clay Co. v. York Clay Co., 241 Pa. 305, 88 At. 487 (1913).
'oThomison v. Hillcrest Athletic Ass'n, 9 W. W. Harr. 590, 5 A.2d 236 (Del.
1939).
"Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952); Zurn v. City of Chicago,
389 Ill. 114, 59 N.E.X2d 18 (1945).
' 2See Annot., 44 A.L.R2d 1447 (1955).
'3See Fordham, The Challenge of Contemporary Urban Problems, 6 U. FLA.
L. R . 275, 281 (1953); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1420 (1955).
14Adams v. Housing Auth., supra note 11; Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C.
563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956).
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In this context, public use requires a public redevelopment authority
as an implementing mechanism as opposed to private developers.
Georgia joined the majority by a constitutional amendment providing
for urban redevelopment, overruling a prior holding adverse to a
redevelopment act.' 5
Eminent domain is to be distinguished from the police power
from which zoning ordinances are derived. The police power exists
in the sovereign and, as with other municipal powers, must be delegated to a city by the legislature. The police power may be employed
to regulate the use and enjoyment of property by the owner. He is
deprived of his property outright to promote the public welfare, even
though it is not acquired by the sovereign for a public use. This
deprivation usually takes the form of restrictions on the uses to which
land can be put. An example would be the required removal under
a zoning ordinance of buildings from within a certain distance of a
right of way. The owner is not entitled to compensation for any
injury that he may sustain in consequence. The law considers that
the injury is damnum absque injuria, or that the owner is sufficiently
compensated by sharing in the general benefits resulting from this
exercise of the police power. 16 When private property is taken for
public use under eminent domain proceedings, however, the owner is
entitled to compensation.

1

7

Only land clearance can be accomplished by zoning legislation.
The fee to zoned land remains in the private owner. Negative coercion, requiring the private owner to utilize his property in conformity
with the zoning ordinance or not at all, falls far short of what is
sought to be accomplished by an urban renewal program. Furthermore, zoning is a process that consumes considerable time. Unless a
city is acting to abate a public nuisance, it must permit an amortization period for established non-conforming uses, so that those affected
by its ordinance will have sufficient time to conform to the prescribed
land use.' 8
Urban redevelopment acts authorizing eminent domain have been
15Sce Bailey v. Housing Auth., 214 Ga. 790, 107 S.E.2d 812 (1959).
loChicago B. K- Q. Ry. v. People ex rel. Grimwood, 212 Ill. 103, 72 N.E. 219

(1904), citing Frazer v. City of Chicago, 186 I1. 480, 57 N.E. 1055 (1900).
'7Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952); Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v.
People ex rel. Grimwood, supra note 16.
'sSee Note, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 322 (1959). For a comparison of city ordinances
to common law principles of nuisance abatement see Noel, Retroactive Zoning
and Nuisance, 41 COLuM. L. REV. 457 (1941).
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used in conjunction with a comprehensive zoning plain. 19 It is wise
for a municipality to undertake urban renewal with an over-all city
plan in mind. City planning is the broader concept of which urban
renewal is a necessary element, when blight or slums exist.
FLORIDA'S POSITION

In 1945 the Florida legislature purported to provide municipalities with a means of undertaking urban renewal programs where
they were needed. 20 This act provided for the establishment in each
city of a municipal housing authority charged with the task of initiating redevelopment projects and for utilization by these authorities
of available federal funds.21 The act further prescribed the use of
eminent domain and the lease or sale of condemned land to private
development corporations. This law, a general act, is similar to urban
redevelopment statutes in other jurisdictions. These enabling laws
have been held constitutional in at least twenty jurisdictions, notwithstanding provisions for sale or lease of condemned property to
private developers.

22

In 1950 the Housing Authority of Daytona Beach sought to acquire by purchase and eminent domain six and one-half acres of
real estate in an area zoned commercial and for light industry and
inhabited by low income families. After condemnation, the land was
to be turned over to private commercial and industrial enterprises.
In Adams v. Housing Authority23 the Florida Supreme Court held
that the acquisition of real estate for such disposition was not for
public use or purpose and that the statute authorizing the procedure
was unconstitutional. Four provisions of the Florida Constitution
were found to have been violated.24 Vitiating the Daytona Beach plan
19City planning is generally conceded to embrace the entire group of complex
urban problems -physical, social, economic, and governmental. See Bartley,
Legal Problems in Florida Municipal Zoning, 6 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 355, 356 (1953).

2oFia. Laws 1945, ch. 23077.
2
lSee 42 U.S.C. §§1441-62 (1958).
22
See Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1420 (1926).
2360 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
241d. at 670. The Court held the following provisions of the Florida Constitution to have been violated and gave the indicated reasons therefor:
"(1) Section 1 of the Declaration of Rights in that the inalienable right of the
citizens to acquire, possess and protect property would be denied; public authorities would be permitted to take one man's property against his will and make it
available to another group for their private purpose rather than a public use,
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as a real estate promotion scheme disguised as a redevelopment plan,23
the majority noted the adequacy of the city's police power to abate a
blighted area. The Court also cited Standard Oil Co. v. City of
Tallahassee,26 a federal case applying Florida law, which involved a
suit to enjoin enforcement of a city zoning ordinance requiring removal of a gasoline station from state-owned property. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held the ordinance to be a reasonable exer-

cise of the city's police power. Unfortunately, although the police
power can accomplish removal of a blighted or slum area, it is impotent as far as redevelopment is concerned.
The Florida Court has held constitutional a city's condemnation of
privately owned land for use as a municipal parking lot when part of
the lot had been leased to private interests for the operation of a
gasoline station.27 Lease of a county owned fishing pier to private
interests to gain revenue for the county, when the portion leased was
not required for a public park, has also been held constitutional.28
However, the City of Clearwater's attempt to lease a tract to private
individuals who intended to construct a private hotel was held unconstitutional by the Florida Court.

29

In a case arising in Panama City the Supreme Court of Florida
held that the housing authority could acquire realty but could not
turn it over to private interests for development of a proposed naval
low rent housing project under their control. ° In State v. Town of
North Miami3l the Court held that a proposed issue of municipal
"(2) Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights and Section 29 of Article XVI in
that the taking of private property for a purpose or use not public, to wit, for
the purpose of selling or leasing the same for private use, profit and gain to
other individuals, corporations or associations is attempted to be authorized and
consummated,
"(3) Section 5 of Article IX in that the expenditure of public funds and the
assessment and imposition of taxes for a purpose not public nor municipal would
be authorized,
" (4) Section 10 of Article IX in that an attempt is made to authorize and consummate the appropriation of public or municipal funds or money, or the loaning
of credit of a municipality to corporations, associations, institutions, or individuals
for a purpose not public nor municipal and for private gain and profit."
2560 So. 2d at 666.
26183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950).
27Gate City Garage v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
2sSunny Isles Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Dade County, 79 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1955).
29City of Clearwater v. Caldwell, 75 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1954).
30Lewis v. Peters, 66 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1953).
3159 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
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bonds was invalid because the proceeds were to be used to purchase
land and erect an industrial plant thereon with subsequent lease of
the property to a private corporation.
All of these cases, though not involving redevelopment acts, illustrate the Florida position on the public use question. By analogy,
they relate to Adams and other cases that do involve these acts. The
32
Florida Court has approved the following definition of "public use":
"A use to be public must be fixed and definite. It must be one
in which the public, as such, has an interest, and the terms and
manner of its enjoyment must be within the control of the
State, independent of the rights of the private owner of the
property appropriated to the use. The use of property cannot
be said to be public if it can be gainsaid, denied, or withdrawn
by the owner. The public interest must dominate the private
gain."
The Court has said that the use may be "local or limited, and yet be
a public use," and that "if the main object for which land is taken is
a public use, it obviously matters not that incidental benefit will
3
inure to private individuals.."
From the foregoing cases it may be concluded that the Florida
Court does not approve of municipal action that results in lease or
sale in toto of municipally owned realty to private interests. There
must be more than an incidental benefit to the public. On the other
hand, if the end result is such that the public enjoys the benefit or
use of municipally owned land, lease of a de minimis part of that
land to private interests is not unconstitutional. In those cases approving lease of a part of the publicly owned land to private interests,
the private activity had a definite relationship to the particular public
use to which the entire tract was devoted. This is illustrated by the
municipal parking lot case and the fishing pier case discussed above.
In Adams the Court regrettably "threw out the baby with the bath
water."
The Court did not simply declare the particular redevelopment plan involved unconstitutional, but invalidated the statute
under which Daytona Beach purported to act. As a result, there is
32Demetar Land Co. v. Florida Public Serv. Co., 99 Fla. 954, 964, 128 So. 402,
406 (1930).
33Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 44, 123 So. 527, 533 (1929).
34THE FLORIDA PLANNING & ZONING ASS'N, Urban Renewal in Florida, in 10
Florida Planning and Development, No. 12, p. 1 (Dec. 1959).
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now no constitutional general law upon which a Florida municipality
may rely in attempting urban redevelopment.
The City of Tampa, acting pursuant to the Urban Renewal Law
of 1957, 3 5 a special act applicable only to that city, undertook a redevelopment project that involved forty acres of slum area within
the city. In Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency,3 6 involving a suit
to enjoin the City of Tampa and its urban agency from further pursuance of the redevelopment program, the Florida Supreme Court
upheld the act. The Court recognized that slum as distinguished
from blight clearance was per se a public purpose.3 7 The Court further held that the public purpose of the plan was not defeated because of lease or sale of the property to private interests, a possible
non-public use. Here perhaps can be seen a conceptual merger of public use with public purpose. The main object for which the land
was taken was slum clearance, a public purpose. The public interest
dominates, and thus the only private use, development by private
enterprise, is incidental to the over-all purpose. The area involved
was to be returned primarily to residential use in conjunction with
neighborhood commercial establishments to serve the residents. The
35Fla. Spec. Acts 1957, ch. 57-1904.
36115 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
37Fla. Spec. Acts 1957, ch. 57-1904, §§18 (f), (g), defines slum and blighted areas
as follows: "'Slum area' shall mean an area in which there is a predominance of
building or improvements, whether residential or non-residential, which by reason
of dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence, inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or open spaces, high density of population and overcrowding, or the existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire
and other causes, or any combination of such factors is conducive to ill health,
transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, or crime, and is
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.
"'Blighted area' shall mean an area which by reason of the presence of a substantial number of slum, deteriorated or deteriorating structures, predominance of
defective or inadequate street layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy,
accessibility or usefulness, insanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or
other improvements, diversity of ownership, tax or special assessment delinquency
exceeding the fair value of the land, defective or unusual conditions of title, or
the existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire and other
causes, or any combination of such factors, substantially impairs or arrests the
sound growth of a municipality, retards the provision of housing accommodations
or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health,
safety, morals, or welfare in its present condition and use: Provided, that if such
blighted area consists of open land the conditions contained in the proviso in
Section 6 (d) shall apply: And provided further, that any disaster area referred to
in subsection (g) of Section 6 shall constitute a 'blighted area.'"
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Court emphasized that the decision was confined to that part of the
act relating to slum clearance and that it expressed no opinion on that
part of the act relating to blighted areas.
In Berman v. Parker38 the United States Supreme Court upheld a
redevelopment act of the District of Columbia for the removal of
slum areas, stating that it was not a violation of the fifth amendment.
The Court held that it was within the power of the legislature to take
into account aesthetic considerations as well as those of health when
enacting redevelopment legislation. In effect the power of eminent
domain was looked upon as a means of protecting the health, welfare,
and morals of the inhabitants of the District of Columbia. The Grub39
stein case did not go this far.
Confronted with the Adams case, the Court in Grubstein relied
heavily on the definitions of "slum" and "blighted area" to distinguish
the two. Only a blighted area was sought to be redeveloped in the
Adams case, and no relation to the public health, safety, or welfare
that would justify use of eminent domain was found.
Justice Thornal, concurring in Grubstein, went further and asserted that the Adams decision had been "whittled away" to the point
where its judgment was nothing more than a disposition of the particular project proposed in that case. 40 In other words, the Adams
decision need not have gone so far as to declare the Housing Authorities Law 1 unconstitutional but should have been confined to
declaring unconstitutional the particular plan involved. Justice
Thornal's opinion reflects the conclusion of many critics. 42
The foregoing survey of Florida cases indicates that a Florida city
faced with a slum or blight problem may legally remove this mischief
by acting pursuant to its police power-zoning ordinance or abatement of a public nuisance-or by utilizing a special act patterned
after the Urban Renewal Act of 1957. However, any project undertaken pursuant to the Housing Authorities Law, a general act, risks
frustration by the rule of the Adams case in spite of its modification
by the Grubstein decision. Furthermore, in Grubstein, the Court as38348 U.S. 26 (1954).
3sSee Note, 34 TuL. L. REv. 616 (1959).
40115 So. 2d at 755.

4dFla. Laws 1945, ch. 23077; FLA. STAT. ANN. §421.08, note (1960).
42
See e.g., Dauer & Miller, Municipal Charters in Florida, 6 U. FLA. L. Rxv.
427 (1953); Fordham, supra note 13 at 429; Foss, Interested Third Parties in
Zoning, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 16, 45 (1959); Patterson, Legal Aspects of Florida Municipal Bond Financing, 6 U. FLA. L. Ray. 312 (1953).
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serted that the decision was confined to that part of the act pertaining
to slum clearance.

When the question of blight removal, pursuant to an urban renewal program, comes before the Florida Court it is a matter of conjecture as to how the Court will hold. Apparent emphasis previously
given by the Court to the distinction between blight and slum precludes a prediction that the Court will rule favorably on a redevelopment plan to remedy blight except perhaps in a case in which it can
be shown that the blighted area has reached the point where only
urban redevelopment can ward off a threatened debilitation of the
public's health, welfare and morals. Other jurisdictions, while not
distinguishing slum from blight as those terms are used by the Florida
43
Court, have held blight elimination to be a public purpose.
Apparently the Grubstein decision, concerning slum clearance,
modified the Adams holding, which involved a blighted area, to the
extent that the use of private interests in a redevelopment program
does not per se render the plan unconstitutional. This decision represents belated judicial recognition in Florida of the solution of an
urban problem of growing intensity. The Florida Court has seemingly
accepted as a public purpose a renewal program providing for removal of a slum. The vehicle of private enterprise to achieve slum
clearance no longer seems to face judicial condemnation in Florida
when used to implement a renewal act. It may still be condemned,
however, when the only community objective is blight removal. Unless the blight is shown to be a serious threat to the public, its removal may not be held to constitute a public purpose.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Though the Grubstein opinion seems to be a green light for urban
renewal in Florida, it may be construed in the future as having approved only slum clearance under the Urban Renewal Act of 1957.
To avoid this result without attempting to breathe life anew into
the Housing Authorities Law, the Florida legislature convening in
1961 should pass a general act patterned after the Urban Renewal
Act of 1957. This proposed act should provide separately for slum
and blight removal. There should be a severability clause to preclude
43E.g., Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Il1. 114, 59 N.E.2d 18 (1945); Bellowsky v.
Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947); see Fordham, supra
note 13, at 275, 281.
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